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CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW:

COMMERCIAL ADVERTISING-

THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.

Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The first amendment of the Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
' This restriction on legislative power applies to the state
...
legislature as well as the United States Congress due to the adoption
of the fourteenth amendment and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States interpreting the first and fourteenth amendments.' Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, as the final
interpreter of the Constitution, has been unwilling to give the force
of law to the plain meaning of the above quoted language of the first
amendment. The Court has consistently held that Congress or the
states may abridge the freedom of speech if certain types of speech
are involved.
Until Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc.,3 one such unprotected type of speech was
"purely commercial advertising" or "commercial speech" as it was
later identified.4 Although it was not stated explicitly in any of the
cases, the thought behind the exception seems to have been that the
first and fourteenth amendments protected speech in the marketplace of ideas, especially if the idea was political or religious, but
in the marketplace of products or services, the Constitution imposed
no restrictions on either federal or state government in respect to
purely commercial advertising.' As a result, these governments were
free to regulate or prohibit commercial speech in almost any manner.

II.

FACTS

The dispute in this case arose when a resident of Virginia, who
was required to take prescription drugs daily for treatment of a
disease, and two nonprofit organizations, 6 each with many members
who used prescription drugs, brought suit in the United States Dis1.
2.
(1943).
3.
4.
Martin
5.
6.

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
425 U.S. 748 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Board v. Consumers].
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (purely commercial advertising);
v. Struthers, 318 U.S. 141 (1943) (commercial speech).
See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1942).
In addition to the named plaintiff, the Virginia state AFL-CIO also joined in the suit.
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trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The plaintiffs challenged, under the first and fourteenth amendments, one section of
a Virginia statute7 which declared it to be unprofessional conduct
for any pharmacist to advertise the price of any drug dispensed only
by prescription. The defendants in the suit were the Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, the state agency which regulated the practice
of pharmacy in Virginia, and its individual members. Among the
Board's extensive regulatory powers were its authority to issue the
license a pharmacist was required to have in order to practice pharmacy in Virginia, and to enforce the advertising prohibition by disciplining a pharmacist found guilty of unprofessional conduct by revoking or suspending the required license. Because the broad advertising prohibition applied to pharmacists, and since with few exceptions, only licensed pharmacists could dispense prescription drugs
in Virginia,8 normal advertising and effective dissemination of prescription drug price information was forbidden by the statute.,
The parties to the suit stipulated that pharmacy was a profession and that prescription drug prices varied within the same locality in Virginia by as much as 650 percent for the same prescription
and as much as 1200 percent within the same locality in the nation.
They also stipulated that ninety-five percent of all prescriptions
were now filled with dosage forms prepared by the drug manufacturer and that, without the statute, some pharmacies in Virginia
would advertise prescription drug prices.' 0
In striking down the Virginia statute, the district court" entered an order of injunction and a declaratory judgment for the
plaintiffs. The statute had to fall because, in the court's view, it
denied the plaintiffs their first amendment right to know, without
12
an adequate justification of the denial by the Board.

7. VA. CODE § 54-524.35 (1974) reads in relevant part: "Any pharmacist shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct who. . . (3) published, advertises or promotes, directly
or indirectly, in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount, rebate
or credit terms for professional services or for drugs containing narcotics or for any drugs
which may be dispensed only by prescription."
8. Id. section 54-524.53. The provision excepts legally qualified practitioners of medicine, dentistry, osteopathy, chiropody, and veterinary medicine.
9. Board v. Consumers, 425 U.S. 752-54.
10. Id. at 752-55.
11. The district court sat as a three judge panel which consisted of Senior Circuit Judge
Bryan, the author of the court's opinion, and District Judges MacKenzie and Merhige.
12. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. v. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, 373
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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III.

HOLDING

3
On direct appeal the Supreme Court of the United States
affirmed, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun." The first
issue decided by the Court was "whether, even assuming that First
Amendment protection attaches to the flow of drug price information, it is a protection enjoyed by the appellees as recipients of the
information, and not solely, if at all, by the advertisers themselves
who seek to disseminate that information."' 5 The majority's answer,
conditioned on the later finding that there was a right to advertise,
was that a reciprocal right to receive advertising did exist and that
this right could be asserted by the appellees in this case." The Court
arrived at this conclusion through the stipulation of the parties that,
in the absence of the challenged statute, some pharmacies in Virginia would advertise; that is, a willing speaker existed. Using this
basis, the Court relied on a series of cases 7 which held that the
protection provided by the first amendment attached to the communication, and thus protected both the source of the communication and any recipient of the communication. Therefore, the appellees could assert their right to receive advertising if the advertising
was found to be protected by the Constitution."
The second issue before the Court was whether there existed a
first amendment exception for commercial speech; that is, whether
speech which merely proposed a commercial transaction and did not
concern itself with ideas on the subjects of truth, science, morality,
the arts, or government was beyond all protection of the first
amendment." The majority's answer was that there was no first
amendment exception for commercial speech that was so broad as
to place commercial speech beyond all protection of the first
amendment.10
The Court reached this conclusion by examining the interests
of the parties involved. Although the advertiser's interest might be
purely economic, this alone did not disqualify him from first amend13. The defendants appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253: Direct appeals from decisions of
three-judge courts.
14. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart each wrote concurring opinions. Justice
Rehnquist dissented and Justice Stevens did not participate.
15. Board v. Consumers, 425 U.S. at 756.
16. Id.
17. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
18. Board v. Consumers, 425 U.S. at 756-57.
19. Id. at 762.
20. Id.
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ment protection, since an employer's economic interests had been
held not to disqualify him from protection when he spoke on the
merits of a labor dispute in order to influence its outcome. Consumers and society in general had a strong interest in the free flow of
commercial information because such information would enable
them to expend their scarce dollars and other resources more efficiently. The state, while it had a strong interest in maintaining a
high degree of professionalism among its licensed pharmacists,
could satisfy its interests in other ways. The advertising ban did not
directly affect professional standards, but it did keep the public
ignorant of the entirely lawful terms that competing pharmacists
were offering.'
Whatever might by the proper bounds of time, place, and manner restrictions, they were clearly exceeded by this statute which
singled out speech of a particular content and sought to prevent its
dissemination entirely. There was no claim that prescription drug
price advertisements were forbidden because they were false or misleading, nor that the transactions proposed in the advertisements
were themselves illegal. The state could not suppress the dissemination of truthful information about a lawful activity merely because
it feared the effect of the information upon the advertisers and the
22
recipients.
IV.

BACKGROUND

The commercial speech doctrine, as an exception to the first
amendment, began with neither concurrence nor dissent in the three
2 3 There,
page opinion of Valentine v. Chrestensen.
Chrestensen
sought an injunction against Valentine, the New York City police
commissioner, to prevent police interference with the distribution
in the city streets of a handbill that carried advertising for a commercial exhibit on one side and a protest against city action on the
21. Id. at 763-70.
22. Id. at 771-73.
23. 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Chrestensen, the owner of a former United States Navy submarine docked in New York City, prepared handbills to advertise tours of the boat for which
admission was charged. He was advised that the distribution of the handbills in the streets
would violate a city ordinance prohibiting the distribution in the streets of commercial advertising matter, but the ordinance permitted the distribution in the streets of handbills devoted
solely to information or a public protest. Chrestensen revised his handbills: on one side was
an advertisement of the submarine tours that did not mention the admission charge, and on
the other side was a protest against the city dock department's refusal to permit Chrestensen
to dock and exhibit his submarine at a city pier. The police still refused to permit the
distribution of the handbills. This chain of events supported the Court's conclusion that the
protest was added to the advertisement for the purpose of evading the ordinance, something
the Court was reluctant to permit. Chrestensen brought suit initially in federal district court.
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other side. Valentine sought to enforce a city ordinance that permitted the distribution of a public protest but prohibited the distribution of commercial advertising. The Supreme Court reversed
the lower court's issuance of the injunction and held that although
the Constitution clearly imposed restraints on government so that
it may not unduly burden the use of the public streets for the exercise of the freedom of communication, nonetheless it was "equally
clear that the Constitution impose[d] no such restraints on government as respects purely commercial advertising."'" Due to the dual
nature of the handbill, it could be classified as purely commercial
advertising in substance but not in form. The Court was particularly
concerned that the ordinance not be evaded on the grounds of free
speech.
The commercial nature of the exception became more obvious
the following year in Martin v. Struthers.5 There, Martin was convicted of violating a municipal ordinance which prohibited persons
from summoning occupants of a residence to the door in order to
give them any sort of literature, even the religious literature Martin
distributed. The distributor was subject to criminal punishment
even if the'recipient was glad to receive the literature. The Supreme
Court reversed and held that since the ordinance's prohibition
served no purpose but the naked restriction of the dissemination of
ideas, it was invalid because it conflicted needlessly with freedom
of speech and press. The freedom to distribute information to every
citizen wherever he desired to receive it was vital to the preservation
of a free society, and the dangers of distribution could be easily
controlled through the traditional trespass theory, since the distributor was subject to arrest for entering the property of another after
being warned, either verbally or by posted notices, to stay away.
The Court noted that the ordinance was not directed solely at commercial advertising, thereby implying that the ordinance might
have withstood constitutional attack if it were."
The possibility of control of the distributor through the traditional trespass theory was not seriously considered and the commercial speech exception of Chrestensen was stressed in Breard v.
24. Id. at 54.
25. 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Martin's appeal was eventually dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Ohio. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in a five to four decision
involving five written opinions. The City of Struthers, Ohio, sought through the ordinance to
eliminate both the nuisance of door to door soliciting and the danger that it was a blind for
criminal activity (burglars often posed as canvassers to discover empty houses).
26. Id. at 142-49.
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Alexandria.2 Breard was convicted of violating an ordinance which
prohibited a solicitor from going to a private residence for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods without first having
been invited for that purpose by an owner or occupant of the private
residence. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the
conviction because, among other reasons, the ordinance did not
violate the guarantees of free speech and press. The Court stated
that the fact that periodicals were sold did not put them beyond the
protection of the first amendment, but did bring a commercial feature to the transaction. Because it was possible to subscribe to the
publications without the annoyance of house to house canvassing,
and because it seemed to the Court to be a misuse of the guarantees
of free speech and press to force a community to admit solicitors of
publications to the homes of its residents, Breard's convicton
stood. 2 The Court thus increased the scope of the commercial
speech exception from purely commercial speech concerning a
purely commercial, unprotected activity in Chrestensen, to commercial speech concerning an otherwise protected activity in
Breard.
Perhaps some erosion of the commercial speech exception, or at
least some slight movement away from the exception, can be found
in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human
Relations." The newspaper was found to have violated a Pittsburgh
ordinance in that it aided employers and employment agencies to
place employment notices indicating sex discrimination in hiring by
maintaining a sex-designated classification system in the help
wanted section of its newspaper. The cease and desist order was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States. The majority
27. 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Breard's was a misdemeanor conviction in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana, and his conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. In the
Supreme Court of the United States, the ordinance also withstood attacks on due process and
commerce clause grounds.
28. Id. at 641-45.
29. 413 U.S. 376 (1973). Section 8 of the Pittsburgh ordinance declared it to be an
unlawful employment practice for (a) an employer to discriminate in hiring because of sex,
(e) an employer, employment agency, or labor organization to publish employment notices
indicating discrimination in hiring because of sex, and (j) anyone to aid in the doing of an
act declared to be an unlawful employment practice by the ordinance. The ordinance was to
be implemented by the Commission. The Press, in its newspaper's help wanted advertisements, used columns headed "Jobs-Male Interest," "Jobs-Female Interest," and "MaleFemale," an item being placed under a particular heading according to the wishes of the
advertiser. Subsequent to the filing of a complaint, the Commission held a hearing and
concluded that § 8(e) forbade employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations from
submitting advertisements for placement in sex-designated columns and that the Press violated § 8(j) because it aided the advertisers to violate § 8(e) by maintaining a sex-designated
classification system. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.
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felt the critical feature of Chrestensen was that the advertisement
there did no more than propose a commercial transaction as did the
advertisements in this case. They characterized the ads as classic
examples of commercial speech, even though the Press might exercise its editorial judgment in placing an advertisement. This was
probably enough to sustain the cease and desist order, but the Court
added that discrimination in employment was not only commercial
activity, but also illegal activity under an unchallenged portion of
the ordinance, and the restriction on advertising was incidental to
a valid limitation on economic activity. 0 The commercial speech
exception had grown again, this time to encompass editorial judgment in commercial speech. The only movement away from the
exception was to sustain the holding on the alternate grounds the
activity was also illegal.
If the movement away from the commercial speech exception
was almost impossible to see in Pittsburgh Press, it was almost
impossible to miss in Bigelow v. Virginia.3' There, Bigelow, the responsible officer of a weekly Virginia newspaper, published a New
York organization's advertisement announcing that the organization arranged placement in accredited institutions in New York,
where abortions were legal with no residency requirements, for
women with unwanted pregnancies. Bigelow was convicted of violating a Virginia statute which forbade any person, by publication
or sale, to encourage or prompt the procurement of an abortion. The
Supreme Court of the United States reversed Bigelow's conviction
because the advertisement did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It announced that abortions were legal in New
York, a factual matter of clear public interest. Even though the
advertisement was an exercise of the freedom of communication of
information, it would be subject to a reasonable regulation that
served a legitimate public interest. The Court balanced the public's
30. Id. at 388-91. The Court noted that the ordinance did not undermine the institutional viability of the press, it was not passed to muzzle or to curb the press, and the cease
and desist order was not a prior restraint. Id. at 389-90.
31. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). Bigelow's misdemeanor conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Supreme Court of the United States declined to rest its decision
on the grounds of the overbreadth of the statute due to a revision of the statute's language
since Bigelow's conviction, and examined the constitutionality of the statute as it was applied
to Bigelow. The Court stated that Chrestensen did not indicate that speech was stripped of
first amendment protection because it appeared in the form of a paid commercial advertisement, and the holding there was limited to and explained as a reasonable regulation on the
manner in which commercial advertisements could be distributed. The majority also indicated that the advertisements in PittsburghPress would have received some protection if the
commercial transactions proposed there had been legal.
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right to know against Virginia's interest in regulating what Virginians read or heard about New York services. Because the advertisement was neither deceptive nor fraudulent, did not relate to a commodity or service which was illegal in either state, did not invade
anyone's privacy, and was not thrust upon a captive audience, Bigelow's conviction was reversed.32
When Board v. Consumers came before the Supreme Court of
the United States, the commercial speech exception had clearly
been diminished in Bigelow. In the course of almost thirty-five years
the commercial speech exception grew to exclude from the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments purely commercial advertisements for a purely commercial activity in Chrestensen,
purely commercial advertisements for a protected activity in
Breard, and commercial advertisements involving editorial judgment for a commercial activity in PittsburghPress. In Bigelow, the
Court undercut the Chrestensen and Pittsburgh Press holdings on
commercial speech, but did not meet the issue head on. The Court
did face the issue in Board v. Consumers.3
V. ANALYSIS
The Court's answer to its first question, that if there was a right
to advertise, there was a right to receive advertising which could be
asserted by the appellees in this case, was not novel. That free
speech and free press embrace both the right to distribute literature
and the right to receive was recognized at least as far back as Martin
v. Struthers;31 indeed, these guarantees of freedom would be empty
if there were free transmission of ideas and information but limited
reception of them. The second part of the answer, that the appellees
could assert their right to receive advertising, was also supported by
precedent 35 and logic. This followed from the first part of the answer,
since a right to receive communication is useless if one may not
assert the right when it is infringed.
The answer to the first question was in line with the cautious
and limited nature of the opinion. This decision depended on the
later holding by the Court that there was a right to advertise, 36 for
32. Id. at 811-29.
33. The cases discussed above do not form a comprehensive list of cases dealing with
the commercial speech exception. For additional background material concerning commercial speech in the federal courts, see Note, Commercial Speech-An End in Sight to
Chrestensen? 23 DEPAUL L. Ray. 1258 (1974); for background in the state courts, see 37
BROOKLYN L. REv. 617 (1971); 24 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 299 (1967).
34. 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
35. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
36. Board v. Consumers, 425 U.S. at 758.
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if there were no right to advertise, there would be no right to receive
advertising. Thus, a right to receive some particular communication
must be based on a showing that the communication is protected
by the Constitution.
The second question before the Court was whether there existed
a right to advertise, or, to put the question in the negative as the
Court did, whether speech which merely proposed a commercial
transaction and was devoid of any other matter which could claim
constitutional protection was beyond all protection of the first
amendment. The Court's answer to its own question, that it was not
beyond all protection, indicated that there was a right to advertise
purely commercial transactions and that this right was protected by
the Constitution. 37 Something was lost in the translation from the
negative to the positive, however, and this void indicated that the
right to advertise will not be given the same protection that other
first amendment rights have been given.
The Court supported its holding through an examination of the
various interests involved. After assuming the advertiser's interest
to be purely economic, the Court evaded the Chrestensen holding
by citing various labor dispute cases which held that although the
party's interests there were primarily economic, their statements
concerning the dispute were still protected by the first amendment
though subject to a number of restrictions.3 The majority did not
distinguish between this speech and purely economic speech, and
the labor dispute cases do support the conclusion that speech involving one's economic interests is entitled to constitutional
protection.31
The consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information can be particularly keen. In the instant case, the aged were
particularly hard hit by the suppression of drug price information."0
Because of their limited income and greater expenditures for prescription drugs, they were more seriously affected by the wide variations in prescription drug prices fostered by the suppression of economic information.
In general, society also has a strong interest in the free flow of
entirely commercial -information. At a minimum, such speech
should contain information concerning who is producing or selling
what product, for what reason, or at what price. The Court consid37. Id. at 762.
38. Id. at 762-63.
39. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969); NLRB v. Virginia Electric &
Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
40. 425 U.S. at 763.
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ered this information to be essential to the intelligent and efficient
allocation of resources in a free enterprise system and to enlightened
public decision making. Here the Court interchanged economic
theory and legal theory. It justified a legal decision on the basis that
the result would change society to more closely resemble the classical economic model in some respects." As a result of the decision,
consumers would have better information concerning the availability of goods at various prices.
Opposing these interests was the interest the state had in maintaining a high degree of professionalism among its pharmacists. The
Court felt that other existing regulations were adequate to serve this
interest, especially since the emphasis in this case was on retail sales
more than on professional standards. The advertising ban did not
directly affect professional standards, and by seeking to protect its
citizens, the state instead kept them ignorant of the lawful terms
competing pharmacists were offering. Virginia was prohibited by
the first amendment from regulating professional standards in this
42
manner.
The Court's precedents, arguments, and balancing of interests
do seem to support the conclusion that commercial speech is entitled to some protection under the first and fourteenth amendments.
Although this case may have sounded the death knell for the commercial speech exception, neither Chrestensen, Breard, nor the
commercial speech aspects of Pittsburgh Press were specifically
overruled. Even though the instant case finished the work that may
have started in Pittsburgh Press and which was clearly evident in
Bigelow, it does not appear that the holdings in the latter cases were
expanded significantly.
The Court stated specifically that it did not hold that commercial speech could never be regulated in any way, and it indicated
that time, place, and manner restrictions would be upheld if they
were justified without reference to the content of the speech, served
a significant governmental interest, and left open alternate channels
of communication. Perhaps this restriction indicates that the bans
on televised liquor and cigarette advertising will be upheld. The
Court also pointed out that the holding that commercial speech
enjoyed first amendment protection was not a decision that it was
indistinguishable from other forms of protected speech. Indeed, the
Court indicated that commercial speech was distinguishable from
other forms of protected speech, particularly because it was more
Id. at 765.
42. Id. at 766-70.
41.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/11

19771

NOTE

durable and its truth more easily verified than other forms of
speech. The majority also pointed out that it foresaw no obstacle to
a state dealing effectively with false, misleading, or deceptive advertising, and the first amendment would not prohibit such regulation.
The Court indicated additionally that advertisements that were in
themselves illegal in any way would not be subject to first amendment protection. Another limitation placed on the holding was that
it may not be automatically applicable to the special problems of
the electronic broadcast media.
Finally, the Court appeared to be particularly impressed with
the fact that ninety five percent of all prescriptions were filled with
dosage forms prepared by the drug manufacturer.43 Therefore, the
pharmacist did little more than transfer a measured part of the
contents of a large bottle into a smaller one and place the physician's dosage instructions on the smaller bottle. The Court viewed
pharmacists as dispensers of essentially standardized products
much more than as suppliers of individualized services. The pharmacist in the majority of cases merely filled the physician's order
with little exercise of any professional judgment or skill on his part.
Therefore, the advertising ban on prescription drug prices is not
analogous to a ban on the advertisement of fees charged by physicians and attorneys for the individualized professional judgment
services they rendered."
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Court's initial premise, that if there was a right to advertise, there was a reciprocal right to receive advertising, was firmly
based on logic and precedent. Indeed, the right to advertise, or any
other aspect of the right of free speech, would be meaningless without the right to receive what was sent and the right to attack, in
court, infringements on one's right. In the free speech and free
press areas, however, there was no right to receive and no right to
assert if that which was sent was not constitutionally protected.
.
The second and major holding of the Court, that commercial
speech was not beyond all protection of the first amendment, was
justified and long overdue. The majority's economic arguments did
no harm to individual rights in this case because the social goal of
economic efficiency supported the individual right to know. Should
an economic goal ever conflict with an individual right in a future
43.
44.

Id. at 752.
Id. at 773-75 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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case, it would be comforting to know that individual rights had
received priority over economic goals in the present case, but no
priorities were set here.
The major disappointment of the decision was that the commercial speech exception of the prior cases was not overruled and
condemned outright. The decision did leave the Chrestensen holding little vitality, but did not strike down that part of Breard which
held that a community might control solicitation for the
distribution of protected literature, or that part of PittsburghPress
which held that a municipal ordinance might control the editorial
judgment of a newspaper. It appears that control in these areas will
remain permissible.
The holding did not open large new areas of speech to the absolute protection of the first amendment, and because it is so narrow,
it probably will not cause many dramatic changes in the present
restrictions on commercial speech. Commercial speech is, however,
entitled to some first amendment protection. The amount of protection is not yet clear, but it appears that it is entitled to less protection than many other types of first amendment rights.
Daniel F. Cusick

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol2/iss2/11

